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Abstract
This paper provides a micro-foundation of the behavior of the banking
industry in a Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium model of the New
Keynesian style. The role of banks is reduced to the supply of loans to
¯rms that must pay the wage bill before they receive revenues from sell-
ing their products. This leads to the so-called cost channel of monetary
policy transmission. Our model is based on the existence of a bank{client
relationship which provides a rationale for monopolistic competition in the
loan market. Using a Calvo-type staggered price setting approach, banks
decide on their loan supply in the light of expectations about the future
course of monetary policy, implying that the adjustment of loan rates to a
monetary policy shock is sticky. This is in contrast to Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) who focus primarily on banks operating under perfect competition,
which means that the loan rate always equals the money market rate. The
structural parameters of our model are determined using a minimum dis-
tance estimation, which matches the theoretical impulse responses to the
empirical responses of an estimated VAR for the euro zone to a monetary
policy shock.
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In the cost channel, banks play a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary
policy. Banks extent credit to ¯rms that depend on external ¯nance for funding
production cost. Changes in credit conditions induce changes in production cost,
which have an impact on the ¯rms' price setting behavior (Barth and Ramey,
2000). The cost channel is seen as working in addition to the interest rate channel,
according to which monetary policy a®ects spending by inducing changes in the
cost of capital and yield on savings.
This paper presents a Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium model of the
New Keynesian style that highlights the role of banks in the cost channel of mon-
etary policy. As banks decide on their loan supply in the light of expectations
about the future course of monetary policy, this implies that bank behavior occu-
pies a meaningful part in the propagation of monetary policy shocks. Banks care
about future monetary policy because changes in the loan stock are associated
with adjustment cost. This is in contrast to Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who focus
primarily on banks operating costlessly, which means that the loan rate equals the
money market rate { i.e. the policy rate { in each period. Our motivation stems
from the empirical observations from a VAR model for the euro area that the loan
rate follows the policy rate after a monetary policy shock, but the adjustment is
less pronounced.
We estimate the model by applying a minimum distance estimation { as pro-
posed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) { which matches the theoretical impulse responses to the empirical
responses of an estimated VAR model to a monetary policy shock. Our results
reveal that the banking industry plays a meaningful role in propagating and am-
plifying monetary shocks as the adjustment of bank loans in the light of future
changes in the monetary policy rate and changing economic conditions amplify
the initial monetary impulse. In particular the ¯ndings emphasize that the cost
channel in the in°ation adjustment equation are not only driven by loan demand,
but in addition by loan supply factors. This result can be considered as a contri-
bution to literature as we extend earlier ¯ndings by Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
who only model the banking industry as a neutral conveyor of monetary shocks.
22 The Model
We present a New Keynesian model in which banks decide on their loan supply in
the light of expectations about the future course of monetary policy. The model
builds on Gali, Gertler, and Lopez{Salido (2001), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), but yields richer implications for
the evolution of the loan market equilibrium.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j 2 (0;1), deciding on consump-







where Et¡1 denotes the expectation operator, conditional on aggregate and house-
hold j's idiosyncratic information up to { and including { time t¡11, and ¯ 2 (0;1)













where Cj;t is household j's consumption in period t, »t is a taste shock, ¾ is the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion, Nj;t is household j's labor supply, ´ is the
elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, Mj;t=Pt are real cash balances, and º is
the elasticity of marginal utility of money. Ht denotes an external habit variable
which depends positively on consumption of the aggregate household sector in
period t ¡ 1, Ht = hCt¡1.
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility (1) by choosing optimal
consumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:
PtCj;t + Dj;t + Mj;t = Mj;t¡1 + WtNj;t + R
D
t Dj;t¡1 + ¦j;t; (3)
1The assumption that the household's decisions for time t and later are taken on the basis
of the information set in time t ¡ 1 implies that decisions for time t are predetermined. This
is consistent with the identifying restrictions of the VAR model considered below, according to
which output and in°ation are prevented from responding contemporaneously to a monetary
policy shock.
3where Dj;t are deposits hold at banks at the gross deposit rate RD
t , Wt is the nom-
inal wage rate, and ¦j;t are aggregate pro¯ts from the ¯rms and banks distributed
at the end of period t.














where the Lagrange multiplier on the intertemporal budget constraint ¸j;t de-
notes household j's marginal utility of consumption. We assume that ¯nancial
markets are complete, and that households insure themselves against all idiosyn-
cratic risk. Thus, households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and
asset holdings, implying that the ¯rst{order conditions are equal for all households
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Good Producers
The ¯nal good Yt which is entirely used for consumption Ct is produced by a
continuum of wholesale producers in an environment of perfect competition. Final
goods are bundles of di®erentiated goods Yj;t which are provided by a continuum
of monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers. The technology to










where ² > 1 governs the price elasticity of demand for the individual goods. The
optimal allocation of households' expenditure across di®erentiated goods implies






Yt; for all j 2 (0;1); (7)










42.2.2 Intermediate Good Producers
Firms indexed by j 2 (0;1) produce a continuum of goods in monopolistically




where Yj;t is the amount of intermediate good j, Nj;t is employment, ® is the
output elasticity with respect to labor, and At is an aggregate productivity shock.
Firms face price frictions as in Calvo (1983), which implies a staggered price
setting. The price level Pt evolves each period as a weighted average of a fraction
of ¯rms µ that stick with last periods price level Pt¡1 and a fraction of ¯rms 1¡µ
that are allowed to change prices:
P
1¡²






Prices that are reset in the current period P ¤
t can be decomposed into a compo-
nent 1¡! resulting from optimizing (forward-looking) ¯rms and a component !





























subject to the households' aggregate demand given by equation (7). Share holders
to which pro¯ts are redeemed discount cash °ows in i periods to come with a
stochastic factor equal to µi¢i;t+i, where ¢i;t+i denotes the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution of a representative household. Again we assume that pricing
decisions occur prior to the realization of any aggregate time t disturbance. Time










5where 'j;t+i are the real marginal cost. The solution to the optimization problem




















Yt+i = 0; (15)
where P
f
j;t is the optimal price of forward-looking ¯rm j.
Firms rent labor in perfectly competitive markets. Pro¯ts are distributed to
households at the end of each period. As ¯rms are obliged to pay the wage bill in
advance of production, they have to take up loans from the banks at the beginning
of each period amounting to WtNj;t. Repayment by the ¯rms occurs at the end of
each period at the gross lending rate RL
t . Production costs of ¯rm j are therefore
given by RL
t WtNj;t. Cost minimization implies that real marginal cost of ¯rm j















where wt = Wt=Pt is the real wage and Sj;t are real unit labor costs. When the
production is subject to diminishing returns to scale (® < 1), ¯rms with di®erent
production levels face di®erent marginal costs. Relating 'j;t+i to average real





















where we made use of equations (7) and (9).
2.3 Banks
The individual bank j, which operates in an environment of monopolistic compe-









where ³ > 1 is the interest rate elasticity of demand for the individual loan, and
RL
j;t is the gross interest rate of the loan Lj;t provided by bank j.
6Banks face nominal frictions as in Calvo (1983). Each bank resets its loan
rate only with a probability 1¡¿ each period, independently of the time elapsed
since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1¡¿ of banks reset their













t is the newly set loan rate.
A bank that is able to reset in period t chooses the loan rate so as to maximize








As pro¯ts are redeemed to households at the end of each period, the stochastic
discount factor equals the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a rep-
resentative household. In contrast to households and ¯rms, the optimization is
conditional on the set of information available at time t.2 The banks grant loans
to ¯rms Lt, which are ¯nanced by deposits Dt and central bank credits Bt. Time










The central bank administers the policy rate RM
t , which determines the interest
rate on the interbank money market. The deposit rate RD
t is assumed to adjust
in accordance with the policy rate RM
t due to arbitrage conditions (Freixas and
Rochet, 1997, p. 57) and is therefore exogenous for the individual bank. Given
the balance sheet constraint:
Lt = Dt + Bt; (22)
which implies that the loan volume equals the level of deposits { that is chosen
by households { and a cash injection taken up in the form of central bank credits








2This assumption is consistent with the identifying restrictions of the VAR model considered
below, according to which the loan rate reacts contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock.
7The maximization of the intertemporal pro¯t function, which is subject to the


















Lt+i = 0; (24)
where RL¤
j;t is the optimal reset price of bank j.
2.4 The Linearized Model
For the empirical analysis we use a log{linearized version of the model, where
the equations are linearized around their steady states. We employ the following
conventions: assume that Xt is a strictly positive variable and ¹ X denotes the
steady state, then the variable ^ Xt is the logarithmic deviation of the variable
from its steady state, ^ Xt = ln(Xt) ¡ ln( ¹ X).












t ¡ ¼t+1); (25)
where the log{linearized income identity ^ Yt = ^ Ct is applied to substitute out
consumption by income. ^ Yt denotes the output gap; the in°ation rate ¼t is de¯ned
as ¼t = ^ Pt ¡ ^ Pt¡1. In the absence of habit formation, i.e. h = 0, equation (25)
collapses to a purely forward{looking IS{equation.
The in°ation adjustment equation is given by a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve (Gali, Gertler, and Lopez{Salido, 2001):
¼t = °fEt¡1¼t+1 + °b¼t¡1 + ·Et¡1( ^ R
L
t + ^ St); (26)
where °f =
¯µ
µ+![1¡µ(1¡¯)], °b = !





The dynamics of the in°ation rate depends on the size of °b in relation to °f, where
it holds that °f + °b = 1. The parameter · is the sensitivity of in°ation with
respect to the gross loan rate ^ RL
t and the real unit labor cost ^ St. The innovation
compared to a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve is the introduction of the
gross loan rate, which implies the existence of a cost channel as deviations of the
nominal gross loan rate from its steady state are a source of cyclical movements
in the in°ation process.


















which implies that the loan rate is a function of the expected future course of
monetary policy. If the fraction of banks ¿ that stick with the last period's
loan rate goes to zero, ^ RL
t = ^ RM
t at all times t. This corresponds to the approach
chosen by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who focus on banks operating under perfect
competition.
The real unit labor cost evolves according to:
^ St =
µ










where we used the de¯nition of real unit labor cost ^ St = ^ wt + ^ Nt ¡ ^ Yt and the
log{linearized technology ^ Yt = ® ^ Nt.
The model is closed by the central bank's reaction function. The central bank




t = ± ^ R
M
t¡1 + (1 ¡ ±)[Á¼Et¼t+1 + Á^ Y ^ Yt] + z
M
t ; (29)
where ± captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, Á¼ and Á^ Y are the central
bank's reaction coe±cients with respect to the expected in°ation rate and the
output gap and zM
t denotes the monetary policy shock.
Equations (25) to (29) determine the set of endogenous variables: ^ Yt, ^ St, ^ RL
t ,
^ RM
t and ¼t. By assumption the linear rational expectations model is only driven
by a monetary policy shock zM
t .
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Empirical Impulse Responses
As in Peersman and Smets (2003), we employ a VAR model for the euro area of
the form:
Zt = A(L)Zt¡1 + ¹ + "t; (30)
9where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables, ¹ is a vector of constant terms and




where GDPt stands for real output, INFt for the in°ation rate, STRt for the policy
rate of the central bank, which is approximated by a short{term money market
rate, and LRt for the loan rate.
The VAR model is estimated in levels to allow for implicit cointegration rela-
tionships between the variables. The sample period starts in 1990Q1 and ends in
2002Q4.3 The output level is expressed in logs, while the in°ation rate and the
interest rates are in decimals. The vector of constant terms comprises a trend
and a constant. Choosing a lag length of two ensures that the error terms dismiss
signs of autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedasticity.4
Based on the VAR model, we generate impulse responses of the variables
in Zt to a monetary policy shock, which is identi¯ed by imposing a triangular
orthogonalization. The ordering of the variables implies that an innovation in the
money market rate a®ects the output level and the in°ation rate with a lag of one
quarter, while the loan rate is a®ected within the same quarter. Figure 1 displays
the impulse responses of the variables to a monetary policy shock. The simulation
horizon covers 20 quarters. The solid lines denote impulse responses. The dotted
lines are approximate 95% error bands that are derived from a bootstrap routine
with 5000 replications.
Our ¯ndings conform with the impulse responses reported by Peersman and
Smets (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2002) to a monetary policy shock. The
output level declines by degrees, reaches a trough after four quarters, and returns
to the baseline value subsequently. The reaction of the output level corresponds
with the evolution of the output gap. The in°ation rate falls slowly and shows a
3The end of our sample period is determined by the switch to the new MFI interest rate
statistics of the European Central Bank (ECB), which entails a structural break in the interest
rate data.
4The VAR is estimated with JMulti by LÄ utkepohl and KrÄ atzig (2004), which allows to
conduct a variety of test for misspeci¯cation and stability. The outcome of the tests { not
reported here, but available upon request { have shown that the model is well{speci¯ed.
10Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses











−3 RESP. OF GDP TO RM









−3 RESP. OF INFL TO RM







−3 RESP. OF RM TO RM









−3 RESP. OF RL TO RM
Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines display
impulse responses. The dashed lines are 95% error bands. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
11signi¯cant decline only after ¯ve quarters. Following the trough, which is reached
after around eight quarters, it gradually reverts to baseline. The money market
rate increases immediately, then declines temporally, and returns to the baseline
value subsequently. The loan rate follows a similar pattern as the money market
rate, but the reaction is less pronounced.
3.2 Methodology
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) we estimate the parameters of the log{linearized model by matching its the-
oretical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock with the empirical impulse
responses. The theoretical model can be summarized by the following matrix
representation:
¡0Xt = ¡1Xt¡1 + ­zzt + ­##t; (31)
where Xt is the state vector, zt is a vector of shocks and #t is a vector of expec-
tational errors that satisfy Et#t+1 = 0 for all t. The matrices ¡0, ¡1, ­z and ­#
contain the structural parameters of the model (Sims, 2001).
The closed loop dynamics of the model, which serves as a starting point to
generate impulse responses, is given by:
Xt(%) = £X(%)Xt¡1 + £z(%)zt; (32)
where the rational expectations equilibrium is solved by using the method devel-
oped by Sims (2001). For the matching of the impulse responses, we estimate the
following set of parameters:
% = (h µ ! ¿ ± Á¼ Á^ Y);
by minimizing a distance measure between the theoretical impulse responses and
the empirical impulse responses. The remaining parameters were calibrated ac-
cording to estimates typically found in the literature (see table 1). The distinc-
tion between calibrated and estimated parameters is motivated by the fact that
we wanted to estimate only those parameters, which are either sources of real
rigidities (h) and nominal frictions (µ, !, ¿), or policy rule parameters (±, Á¼,
Á^ Y).
12Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Symbol Calibration
Discount factor ¯ 0.99
Risk aversion ¾ 1.00
Monopoly power of ¯rms 1=² 1/11
Production function ® 0.75
Labor supply elasticity ´ 2.00
The optimal estimator of % minimizes the corresponding distance measure









^ ª ¡ ª(%)
´
; (33)
where ^ ª denote the empirical impulse responses, ª(%) describe the mapping from
% to the theoretical impulse responses and V is the weighting matrix with the
variances of ^ ª on the diagonal. The minimization of the distance function implies
that those point estimates with a smaller standard deviation are given a higher
priority.
3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
Table 2 summarizes the estimated set of parameters ^ ª that minimize the distance
measure. The corresponding impulse responses are shown in Figure 2 together
with the empirical impulse responses.
Concerning the Taylor rule, we ¯nd that interest rate smoothing is impor-
tant, that the output gap turns out to be insigni¯cant and that the central bank
positively reacts to the expected in°ation rate in t + 1.
The estimated degree of habit formation is very substantial and seems to
indicate that the hump shaped response in the output gap to a monetary shock
seems to be mainly driven by habit in consumption itself. This estimate seems to
validate the claim of Rudebusch and Fuhrer (2005) that the degree of forward{
lookingness in consumption is small.
The degree of Calvo pricing is - compared with other studies - relatively low
and implies that prices are ¯xed on average for half a year. Rule-of-thumb price
13Figure 2: Theoretical Impulse Responses
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Simulated RM
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−3 RESP. OF RL TO RM
Simulated RL
Estimated RL
Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines display
impulse responses. The dashed lines are 95% error bands. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
14Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Symbol Estimate t-value
Habit formation h 0.89 47.32
Price stickiness µ 0.41 1.98
Rule-of-thumb pricing ! 0.75 18.03
Loan rate stickiness ¿ 0.40 11.54
Taylor rule: smoothing ± 0.72 13.57
Taylor rule: output gap Á^ Y 0.02 0.13
Taylor rule: in°ation Á¼ 1.07 5.25
Notes: The value function is 44.20 with a probability of 0.99824. The probability is calculated
by employing a Chi{Squared distribution with 75 degrees of freedom. The standard errors are
calculated as the square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian matrix resulting
from the optimization of the value function.
setters amount to 75 percent of the ¯rms.
The signi¯cant estimate for ¿ reveals that the banking industry plays a mean-
ingful role in propagating monetary shocks via the cost channel. The degree of
loan rate stickiness ¿ was estimated to be 0.40, which implies that loan rates are
¯xed on average for half a year. This result can be considered as a contribution
to literature as we extend earlier ¯ndings by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who only
model the banking industry as a neutral conveyor of monetary shocks. Their
model of the banking industry can be regardedas a special case of our model with
¿ = 0.
Additionally, the signi¯cant estimate of · is evidence for the existence of a
cost channel in the euro area.
4 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the cost channel of monetary transmission and the role
of the banking industry in the euro{area by using aggregate data. Our motivation
originates from two sources. Empirically, VAR models show that the loan rate
follows the policy rate after a monetary policy shock, but the adjustment is less
pronounced. Theoretically, the standard New Keynesian model (as for example
presented in Woodford, 2003, ch. 4) does not explicitly model a banking industry.
15Therefore we have extended a New Keynesian model including habit formation
and rule{of{thumb setters to allow for a more realistic description of ¯nancial
intermediation. Related literature is in particular Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and
Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006). Empirically, we have evaluated the
existence of a cost channel and the role of the banking industry by matching the
theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary
shock. Our ¯ndings suggest that there is clear evidence for the existence of a
cost channel in Europe working alongside the interest rate channel. This result
is consistent with Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and Schabert (2006), who draw similar
conclusions based on single equation GMM estimates for the G7 countries.
Additionally our ¯ndings suggest that the cost channel in the in°ation ad-
justment equation are not only driven by loan demand, but additionally by loan
supply factors. This result is a contribution to literature and extends earlier ¯nd-
ings by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) who only model the banking industry as a
neutral conveyor of monetary shocks.
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